Khadija Naveed
A s Turkey celebrates the centennial of the founding of the Republic it faces a critical and momentous electoral threshold , by mid 2023 , when the Turkish electorate will go to polls for a combined electoral and legislative elections . It may be highlighted that, the domestic arrangement , goals and the Western aspirations envisaged by Kemal ATA Turk founder of Turkish Republic have ostensibly been derailed . Turkey’s Politics has taken a sharp turn away from democratic ideals , , separation of powers , and rule of law. The coming elections in Turkey would have significant ramifications not only for domestic politics but also for foreign policy . The past two decades of AKP rule were marked by three different foreign policy proclivities . The the first decade was seen as a legacy of similar goals ie Turkeys foreign policy outlooks eg the strengthening of Turkish ties with its trans Atlantic partnership and its firm strategic Westernness was its core objective .Special focus was maintained on EU membership.As a result of series of critical domestic reforms , Turkey was given the green signal to initiate accession negotiations with EU in 2004.
Regionally , In addition , Turkey strived to leverage its position as a reliable geo strategic partner, as a bridge between the West and the Middle East. During those years it engaged in overt diplomacy with Syria and initiated mediation efforts in long standing divisions between Israel and Syria .
Significantly during this period Turkey’s burgeoning economy had a strong bearing on its foreign policy objectives as It was able to become an important actor in international development and humanitarian assistance. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA got engaged in a number of regional assistance projects . Turkish Airlines initiated its ambitious journey to grow into international network and Istanbul became a transport hub .
During this time , Turkish diplomatic net work expanded and eventually it became the fifth largest country in the world overtaking even France and Germany. In short during the first decade of this century Turkey was able to combine continuity with elements of change in its diplomatic practice. Resultantly, Turkey became a more visible and potent actor on the world stage. This is established by the fact that after an absence of 48 years, in 2009, Turkey was elected to a term membership in UN Security Council.Turkey’s transformation rekindled global interest in the ‘Turkish model ‘,as a country that had successfully combined democracy,modernity , economic growth and Islamic identity .
The second era of AKP led Turkish foreign policy focused on reconceptualization of Turkeys sultanist identity and its potential proactive role on the world stage. The main driver of the change was ideology . It was felt that during the Republican years , because of the generations of Turkish secular leaders one dimensional alignment with the West was given preference along with adoption of Western social norms . This included secularism , gender equality , Kemalism and legacy of AtaTurk era reforms .
From the perspective of AKP leadership this unconditional alliance with the West was antithetical to centuries of cultural heritage.Turkey’s new foreign policy , ( after first decade of AKP rule) was to support a societal ideal that was more influenced by religion and socially conservative values . Moreover , changes in the international system provided an opportunity for more ambitious Turkish foreign policy . The end of Cold War combined with prospects of democratic upheaval in Turkey’s southern neighborhood supported the option of a more strategically autonomous foreign policy . Thus the Turkish leadership was enthused by the potential of being in the driving seat because of historical transformation of the region .
The second phase of of AKP era was characterized with more ambitious foreign policy goals in which Turkey was perceived to be a cornerstone of new regional order in line with imagination of country’s domestic audience .Syria was the first in line of fostering covert change after Bashar ul Asad’s refusal for political reform.Turkey embraced an agenda to oust the regime through its support to civilians and armed opposition groups and adopt an open door policy to Syrian refugees. In addition , the ruling AKP established close relations with various political movements ie Muslim Brotherhood in the region , that traced their roots back to some form of political Islam . It was hoped that these movements would rise to power in their respective countries with Turkey to become the dominant external actor in each of them . Hence Turkey found itself party to the internal disputes of foreign countries .
Significantly under AKP power shifted to politicians to the detriment of institutional players. The shift from parliamentary system to Presidential one as a result of 2017 constitutional referendum accentuated these negative changes and further usurped the institutional underpinnings of Turkish foreign policy.Decision making became increasingly driven by a close set of Presidential Advisers .
Turkish foreign policy inclinations in the next decade will depend on the elections outcomes In mid June . The results of elections will determine the trajectory of the Republic as it enters its second century . Regard less of whether Turkey ends up with a different constellation of political leadership , A vote for the current President and the alliance that supports him means a continuation of a Sultanist Presidential system.However the opposition promises a return to fortified parliamentary system more in line with erstwhile democratic politics espoused by its founders with enlightened principles and Western Orientation .
The domestic battle for Turkeys identity what some authors call it’s KulturKampf between a religious, nationalist ,authoritarian and a secular democratic vision is an integral part of forthcoming elections . The upcoming elections in Turkey will have significant global and regional repurcusdiond ,
It May be highlighted that Ankara’s
‘self assessment of being a rising power in a multipolar world will be a permanent fixture of Turkey’s future diplomacy .Moreover
Despite Turkeys tarnished ties with its traditional Allie’s in the West. , it remains firmly tied to Western community of nations . In addition to being a NATO member over 40 percent of the country’s exports are destined for EU member States and 6 percent each to US and UK. In addition Turkey gets most of its Foreign Direct Investment (FD I )and technology from its Western countries .EU member States account for almost 70 percent of all incoming FDI with another 10 percent accounted by US.
The next phase of Turkey’s Foreign relations paradigm will be marked by how well country’s growing capabilities and its ambitions be reframed to allow for a more cooperative foreign policy patterns. This objective would require three fundamental changes .
- a) disengagement of foreign policy from domestic political considerations.
(b) institutionalization of foreign policy, since the Presidential system had led to the erosion of the role of traditional institutions in foreign policy making . (C)Turkey’s foreign policy retransformation will be more effective if Turkey’s partners respond positively to such an agenda of change . The US and EU , Turkey’s strategic Allie’s in domains of security , defense and economy can help Ankara in its bid to develop a new understanding of how Turkey as a rising power can prioritize its foreign policy goals .In a so called poly crisis world that Will emerge along with economic clusters
Turkey will need to consolidate its position in the European economic Cluster to benefit from its markets and technological superiority. On foreign policy three issues will be crucial .( a)Turkey ‘s relations with Greece , which have deteriorated considerably since 2020.Both countries have elections this year within weeks apart and tough talks internally. gives benefits to the incumbents domestically.
(b)The second prominent issue is the decision made by Ankara for NATO’s enlargement which is likely to be stalled before elections.
( c)Finally relations with Russia will continue to play an important role in Turkish foreign and economic policies . Ankara blocked Moscow’s use of its naval fleet in the Black Sea by invoking Montreux Convention which enables it not to allow passage of battleships in case of War through Turkish straits .
Turkey supports UkARINE’s integrity by supplying it with drones and other military material . However, it keeps lines of Communication open with Vladimir Putin by not joining the sanctions regime and welcoming Russian refugees and oligarchs and help broker agreements like grain corridor with UN which alleviates a global problem of grain shortage and food price hikes. Putin openly supports Erdogan’s re-election and even sent some emergency money to Turkey through Rosatom.How long Turkey can continue this balancing act remains a big question mark .
Domestically free and fair elections in Turkey remain a great Challenge. The change in electoral law ) a draconian law) interpreted by a totally partial judiciary are cause for concern as Turkish public takes the sanctity of the vote very seriously and it’s vigilance is the insurance policy for these existential elections .