International Law implications on Iran-US nuclear deal: How Do We Proceed from Here?

Khushdil Khan
Background and Introduction The United States’ departure from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 raised a number of legal issues, and the Biden administration’s hypothetical re-entry into the agreement would include a number of additional obligations and liabilities under international law. The two most important questions regarding the JCPOA’s current status are whether the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement violated international law and whether it is legally permissible for the United States to demand “snapback” measures that would reinstate sanctions against Iran even though the agreement has been terminated. The JCPOA was legally integrated into international law by the United Nations Security Council through Security Council Resolution 2231 after it was negotiated between the parties in July 2015. The JCPOA is not enforceable under domestic law, according to the United States government, which has designated it as a non-binding “political commitment” rather than a treaty. The question of whether or whether the instrument results in obligations under international law is altogether another. There are two ways in which the United States’ termination of the JCPOA could have breached international law. If the JCPOA were regarded as a treaty under international law, one would be by breaking a legally obligated responsibility. Contravening Security Council Resolution 2231 is the alternative option. Is It a Treaty or Not? Commentators differ on whether the JCPOA is a treaty under international law and is therefore covered by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The Iranian government contends that by restarting their centrifuges, they are not transgressing international law but rather responding appropriately to the United States’ breach of treaty duties. Iran claims that the imposition of sanctions violated the JCPOA’s requirement that the United States comply with international law. As a result, the Iranian government resumed uranium enrichment in 2019, in breach of the agreement’s wording. A treaty is defined as “an international agreement concluded between States in writing form and governed by international law” by the VCLT, to which the United States is a signatory but not a party. Whether the JCPOA is “controlled by international law” and whether the JCPOA’s signatories intended to place themselves under legally binding responsibilities is under question. One version of the JCPOA sees it as imposing binding legal duties on all parties, while the other sees it as essentially a non-binding exchange provided by the United States, proposing to end sanctions in exchange for a halt to Iran’s nuclear development. Whether or not the JCPOA should be regarded as a treaty under international law is crucial to questions like whether the United States must reimburse Iran for their breach of the agreement and who should take the lead in resuming negotiations under the JCPOA, but in the end, it is incidental to the question of whether the Iranian regime has the right to pursue a nuclear programme. The unilateral cancellation of a multilateral agreement in reaction to a breach by one party is prohibited by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Iran’s actions nonetheless violate international law insofar as the regime’s uranium enrichment contravenes convention and the nuclear non-proliferation framework created in 1968, even though “specially impacted” states may temporarily “suspend” their commitments in response to a material breach. All nations other than the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France are not allowed to possess nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran ratified in 1970. Regardless of the JCPOA’s status as a treaty, Iran is not permitted by international law to respond to the United States’ exit from the accord by taking actions that would constitute a violation of the NPT. Security Council Resolution 2231: Interpretation Considerations of enforcement follow questions of interpretation as to how Security Resolution 2231 should be interpreted, as is customary in substantive matters of international law. What is beneficial for the parties involved and who will guarantee that a specific interpretation of Resolution 2231 is implemented are inextricably linked to the correct interpretation of the resolution. Many diplomats and representatives of the European parties to the JCPOA adopt a cautious approach that contends that while the United States is not justified in imposing sanctions, its behavior does not reach the point where Iran’s reengagement in its nuclear programme is justified. This view is the most sensible one for the JCPOA’s long-term viability because it encourages Iran to scale back its nuclear programme and the United States to rejoin the agreement. It is also supported by the resolution’s text, context, goal, and purpose. The Security Council resolution uses the word “calls upon” rather than “must” or “must,” which would imply an enforceable violation of international law by the United States and ostensibly legitimize some Iranian countermeasures. This reflects a less binding responsibility. This sentence in the Resolution’s text seems to imply a less strict duty. The International Court of Justice’s legal precedence and earlier readings of Security Council resolutions also support the claim that the United States has not broken any international legal obligations. In the event of “serious non-compliance,” Security Resolution 2231 does permit parties to the JCPOA to “snapback” sanctions against Iran. The majority of experts concur that this privilege is only available to JCPOA members, of which the United States is no longer a part due to its express withdrawal from the accord. Regardless of whether the JCPOA qualifies as a legally binding agreement under international law, the United States’ imposition of sanctions is likely to breach a number of international norms. Due to the lack of implementation of the dispute resolution procedures expressly established in the JCPOA, the American argument for reintroducing snap back sanctions is likely in violation of the responsibilities to act in “good faith” under international law. Even if the JCPOA is not a legally binding agreement that establishes enforceable international law requirements, the United States’ unexpected renunciation of its prior provision did not seem to be an act made in “good faith.” Additionally, after invalidating the JCPOA, the United States might be barred from using its provisions. The estoppel doctrine contends that whatever claims the United States could have under the agreement, which was formally withdrawn in 2018, are nullified by the other parties’ reliance on the United States’ participation in it. Certain institutionalists may object to the JCPOA’s designation as anything other than a treaty, and some American commentators may object to the JCPOA’s prohibition on the imposition of snapback sanctions against the United States. However, this ambiguous stance is most consistent with accepted interpretive norms of international law and offers the best—possibly the only—chance for the JCPOA to remain in effect.