JKCHR – Report
London: Engagement is the instrument that civilised communities have used to secure peace and settle disputes. India and Pakistan are no exception to this rule. However, in this or any other engagement the dividends should be shared in equity and no party should be dispossessed or traded into a quid pro quo. People of Jammu and Kashmir do not have a dispute with India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, their right to self-determination, which involves the question of accession as well, has resulted into the fracture of the State, division of the people and a life under five Governments and five constitutions. For some time we see that life in the Indian administered part of Jammu and Kashmir has degenerated into an occupation. Life is lived as a process and not as a quality. People are waiting for a UN supervised vote to determine their future. India and Pakistan are committed to a UN template for the last 73 years. In the meanwhile, Government of India used around 900000 military personnel and committed an aggression against these people on 5 August 2019. Indian action has savaged all hopes and efforts to see through a Plebiscite in Kashmir. Under these circumstances when India has wronged the people and the habitat of Jammu and Kashmir, there is a question as to how would India and Pakistan adjust their efforts for peace, without being iniquitous to the rights movement of the people of Kashmir. This report examines the merits of the 5 August 2019 Indian action and the efforts afoot to engage each other. Any effort that remains unfair and injurious to the interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, has no future. Let us examine the situation from the point of view of a Kashmiri and make an outside input for the two countries to consider. On 5 August 2019 Government of India has conferred upon itself power and rights in regards to the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir mandated to its ‘sacred trust’, to which it is not entitled and at the same time has deprived people of the territory of rights which they have been guaranteed. The provisional instrument of accession of 26 October 1947 and the UN template on Kashmir first created on 6 January 1948 (S/636) do not entitle India to decide the destiny of the people of Jammu and Kashmir at its discretion. Indian action is a breach of the terms of the Instrument of Accession and under the UN template on Kashmir India has “loaded upon itself a very grave offence against the other party (in this case Pakistan), against the United Nations and against the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination”. The character of Instrument of Accession changed when India surrendered the provisional accession at the UN Security Council on 15 January 1948, for a UN supervised Plebiscite. Indian action of 5 August 2019 in Kashmir has consequences at home, in the neighbourhood and at the international level. Let us first examine how the terms of Accession ring fence India and the extent to which Government of India has attempted a lunge. The basis for Accession and Indian military admission into Kashmir is recorded as the Maharaja’s plea to Governor General of India that “A grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government”. The admission of Indian army into Kashmir on 27.10.1947 was ring-fenced by clear terms of reference and a discipline as follows: 1. Governor General of India Lord Mountbatten rendered it into writing that, “In consistence with their Policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people”. 2. Governor General of India Lord Mountbatten added that, “Meanwhile in response to your Highness’s appeal for military aid action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people”. It is clear that the Indian army has entered into Kashmir as a supplement and as a subordinate force to perform four duties. Five months and three weeks later Indian army became a subject of three restraints placed on it under UN Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948 as follows: 1. Para 2 (c) of UN Security Council Resolution 47 charges India with a duty that, “When the Indian forces have been reduced to the minimum strength…arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles: (i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State; (ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas; (iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area. We see that there is a restraint on the behaviour, number and stationing of Indian troops admitted into Kashmir. They have been identified only “for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order.” However, Netherlands has later challenged this exclusivity claimed by India. It made it clear at the 611th meeting of the Security Council held on 23 December 1952 that, “…there shall be, on the Pakistan side, the minimum number of forces required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite; on the Indian side, in addition to these two criteria, the stipulation “with due regard to the security of the State” must be taken into account – although that does not mean that India has the exclusive responsibility in this respect.” Sheikh Abdullah mislead the UN Security Council by his speech on 5 February 1948, assuring the world community that “the Indian forces were there on a provisional basis and need not be feared because they would be supervised by the Commission of the UN Security Council. The condition of the attendant supervision of the Commission argued by Sheikh Abdullah is missing and has left the Indian army with no holds barred. We have not only overlooked the matter but have very rarely discussed that India has committed itself to a final figure of its army in Kashmir and more importantly that “this force will have no supporting arms such as armour or artillery”. At the 608 meeting of the UN Security Council on 8 December 1952 Indian representative Mrs. Pandit conceded that, “…after careful examination and assessment by its experts, the Government of India had come to the conclusion that a minimum force of 28,000 was required to carry out its responsibilities.” Indian representative added, “However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces, and as a further contribution towards a settlement, the Government of India is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000 to a figure of 21,000 which is absolute and irreducible minimum…. It should further be emphasised that this force will have no supporting arms such as armour or artillery.” We have to admit that our non-interest or an ad hoc interest and an unreliable understanding of the UN template on Kashmir over the years encouraged India to step out of this fencing and heavily populate Kashmir with its army and security forces. According to OHCHR Reports of June 2018 and July 2019, Kashmir is the world’s most militarised human habitat. As far as my memory helps me, I have never ever heard any Kashmiri leader on either side of cease fire line, any one in Government of Azad Kashmir or GB, anyone in Government of Pakistan or anyone else highlighting the fact that Government of India has violated the ‘Good Behaviour’ 4 191 Primrose Lane, Surrey, London CR0 8YQ (UK) t: +44 2033 711 202 f: +44 2084 329 503 e: [email protected] w: www.jkchr.org WhatsApp: 00 44 771 48 46 431 certificate and ‘Surety’ given by Sheikh Abdullah in favour of the need to keep the Indian Army in Kashmir – pending a UN supervised vote. Sheikh Abdullah made two important submissions at the 241st meeting of the UN Security Council on 5 February 1948. He said: (1) “The all-important matter for us was our own liberation from the autocratic rule of the Prince, for which we were fighting and had been fighting for the past seventeen years. We had not achieved that goal, and therefore, I told my people that we must do so first. Then, as free men, we should have to decide where our interests lay. Being a frontier State, Kashmir has borders with both Pakistan and India, and there are advantages and disadvantages for the people of Kashmir attached to each of the three alternatives to which I have referred”. (2)In regard to the question about keeping and trusting the Indian army in Kashmir he held out a character certificate in favour of Indian Army. He gave his reasons and said, ““However, what is the present situation? If I ask the Indian Army to clear out, how am I going to protect the people from the looting, arson, murder, and abduction with which they have been faced all these long months? What is the alternative? The Prime Minister of India long ago declared that the Government of India has no intention of keeping its army permanently stationed in Kashmir. He stated: “We are there only as long as the country is in turmoil. Once law and order are established, once the marauders and the tribesmen leave the country, we will withdraw our army. That pledge is already there.” (3) “There need be no fear, since the Indian Army is there, that this army will interfere in the exercise of a free vote. After all, a commission of the Security Council will be there in order to watch. The Indian Army does not have to go into every village. It will be stationed at certain strategic points, so that in the event of danger from any border, the army will be there to protect that border. The army is there to curb disorders anywhere in the State; that is all. The army will not• be in each and every village in order to watch each and every vote.” (Sheikh Abdullah at 241st meeting of the UN Security Council held on 5 February 1948). Sheikh Abdullah’s character certificate in favour of Indian Army was attended upon by an important caveat of – “After all, a commission of the Security Council will be there in order to watch.” On 5 February 1948 it was a prevailing and convincing assurance. We find that Government of Pakistan for no good reasons except for the preparation to defend the Indian complaint and further to defend her counter claim against India failed to argue and contest the presence of Indian army. It failed to take a cue from the Canadian proposal made that in the interim the Security Council should consider to provide a credible security to the People of Jammu and Kashmir. At the 235th Meeting of the Security Council held on 24 January 1948 there was an advice that we should afford security to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Canada (General McNaughton) at the 235th Meeting of the Security Council held on 24 January 1948 stated, “I speak at this time only to associate myself with the expressions of hope voiced by the representatives of the United Kingdom and United States that the discussions between the representative of India and Pakistan, under the auspices of the President of the Security Council, will continue so that a basis of agreement may be reached: (a)to terminate the fighting; (b)to afford security to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir under some authority which will be recognised by everyone concerned as strictly impartial; (c) and, most important, to provide for a Plebiscite of the people in which all of them will be permitted to express without fear or favour their wishes as to the future government of the State.” The option to afford security to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir under some impartial authority was there. There were opportunities to seek to disengage Indian army in Kashmir. Netherlands and United Kingdom came out forcefully against Indian claim that she had the exclusive responsibility of law and order in Kashmir. United Kingdom came out a stronger defence of equitable demilitarization. UK representative at the 606 meeting of the UN Security Council on 6 November 1952 in para 27 has found the Indian argument, as a condition not compatible with the idea of a ‘free plebiscite’. Sir Gladwyn Jebb said, “I have mentioned earlier that at no stage should demilitarization involve a threat to the cease-fire agreement. This would mean that the forces of each side of the cease-fire line should be, broadly speaking of the same kind. I should make. it dear that the United Kingdom Government has never thought that the proposal to limit the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line to an armed civil force while leaving a military force onreally free plebiscite. I hope that representatives will join me in urging that the parties should resolve any differences they may still have on this point in the way which I have suggested.” Sheikh Abdullah assurance to the UN Security Council in his speech on 5 February 1948, that “the Indian forces were there on a provisional basis and need not be feared because they would be supervised by the Commission of the UN Security Council was ill considered. It would have held ground if the Commission had assumed itself and the supervision of the Commission were not missing. 6 191 Primrose Lane, Surrey, London CR0 8YQ (UK) t: +44 2033 711 202 f: +44 2084 329 503 e: [email protected] w: www.jkchr.org WhatsApp: 00 44 771 48 46 431 Pakistan updated itself in regard to UN template on Kashmir in January 1957. It proposed to send a UN Force into Kashmir. At the 761 meeting of UN SC held on 16 January 1957 Pakistan has proposed that “the Security Council should call upon the parties to withdraw all their troops from the State and should also ensure that the local forces which should be placed under the representative of the Security Council and left behind, are suitably reduced, if not disbanded altogether. The functions of protecting the State and ensuring internal security should be entrusted by the Council to a United Nations Force which should be introduced into the area at once. Let all other forces-Indian, Pakistani and local, be disbanded and non-Kashmiri nationals even in the police forces be removed from the State of Kashmir. It is further requested that an early and firm date be fixed for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. The situation may be saved even at this late stage-but only by these means. The most important of all is to take immediate steps to prevent India from taking the bit into its mouth and defying this august body.” Pakistani proposal of sending a UN Force into Kashmir was endorsed by Australia, Cuba, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and United States of America in Resolution S/3787 dated 14 February 1957. It said, “resolution, therefore, in taking note of the proposal of Pakistan, makes it quite clear that the use of the temporary force could only be considered within the framework of the resolutions in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarization as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission and towards the pacific settlement of the dispute, the use of such a force would deserve consideration.” Government of India’s argument that sending a UN Force into Kashmir would be a violation of State sovereignty. The argument was vehemently dismissed by Philippines. At the 773 Meeting of Security Council held on 20 February 1957, Philippines (Mr. ROMULO) supported the Pakistan’s proposal and the Resolution brought by Australia, Cuba, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and United States of America. Philippines representative said, “I must emphasize that the sovereignty of India or of Pakistan is not involved in the proposal to send a United Nations force into the state of Jammu and Kashmir for a temporary and limited purpose. In the view of both the Council and the Commission, neither India nor Pakistan can bring into question the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This, position is crystal clear in the assurances given by the Commission to the Governments of India and Pakistan and which forms the basis of their acceptance of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 (see documents S/1100, annex 12, p.l05, and S/1430/ Add.l, see also annex V, section A, of the documents submitted as annexes to the statement made by Mr. Krishna Menon [S/PV.762/Add.l].) Under the circumstances and pending the holding of a plebiscite, neither India nor Pakistan can claim sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. There is a need to examine the merits of Indian action of 5 August 2019 in relation to Instrument of Accession and UN template on Kashmir. Instrument of Accession has been examined by the Division Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court comprising of Janki Nath Wazir CJ and Shahmiri J in the case Magher Singh v Principal Secretary J & K Government (May 1953). Examining the impact of the Instrument of Accession the court has said that, “While the Maharaja was under the Paramountcy of the British Crown before the partition of India from 15.8.1947 under section 7, Indian Independence Act (10 & 11 Geo VI Ch. 30) passed by the British Parliament suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed and all functions the other side of the cease-fire line was consistent with a exercisable by His Majesty towards the Jammu and Kashmir State or the ruler thereof and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by treaty or otherwise lapsed and the State became an independent and sovereign State in the full sense of the International Law. Thus whatever limits to the sovereignty of His Highness in relation to matters coming within the sphere of paramountcy existed before 15.8.1947, these ceased to exist and His Highness became an uncontrolled and absolute sovereign even in relation to such spheres from that.” The Division Bench continues to state “Now let us examine what was the effect of the execution of the Instrument of Accession by His Highness on 26.10.1947. This Instrument of Accession which was executed by the Ruler of the independent and sovereign State of Jammu and Kashmir was executed by him under Section 6, Government of India Act 1935, as adopted by the Indian (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947. By executing this Instrument of Accession the Ruler on behalf of the State acceded to the Dominion of India with the object that certain authorities specified in Section 6 (1) (a) shall by virtue of the Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State such functions as would be vested in them by or under the Act. It is clear that, even if the Instrument of Accession had not made any specific reservations therein, the instrument read with Section 6, Government of India Act would leave the residuary sovereignty of the State entirely unaffected. But the Instrument of Accession does not leave this important matter to be determined by implication alone. Clause 8 of the Instrument of Accession runs as follows: “8.Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over the State, or, save as provided by or under this instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority & rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State”. “In view of this clear and express reservation we see that no change whatsoever was affected in the residuary sovereignty of the State or the power of its Ruler so far as the succession of the State to the Dominion of India was concerned. It may not be out of place to mention here that on 5.3.1948 His Highness issued a proclamation by which he appointed a Cabinet to carry on the administration of the State. Sheikh Mohd Abdullah was appointed the Prime Minister and all other Ministers were appointed on his advice. The proclamation laid down that the Cabinet would act on the principle of joint responsibility.” The judgement has examined article 370 and held “A careful examination of this article would show that it in no way altered the basis of relationship between the State and the Union of India. The residuary sovereignty of the State and the powers of its Ruler in matters other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession remained unaffected. The purpose for which Article 370 was incorporated in the Indian Constitution is clear from the language of the article itself. This is also apparent from the speech made by the prominent members of the Government of India who were responsible for drafting this article and piloting it through the Constituent Assembly. On 12.10.1949 this is what the late Sardar Patel, Deputy Leader of the Congress Party, Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for States said in the Constituent Assembly on this subject: – “In view of the special problem with which the Jammu and Kashmir Government is faced, we have made special provision for the continuance of the relationship of the State with the Union on the existing basis”. The judgement has made it clear that the legislative power of the Union of India is “confined to the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications but as a matter of fact these broad categories include a number of items which are listed in the Instrument of Accession”. Government of India has admitted this infirmity in its relationship with the State at the UN Security Council. It has stated at the 533rd meeting of the UN Security Council held on 1 March 1951 that, “There is a tendency in certain quarters to assume that this is just a dispute between India and Pakistan, and that the views of the lawful government of Kashmir need not be considered. This is a mistaken assumption. As I have already said, the authority of the Government of India over the Government of Kashmir is limited to certain subjects; outside that sphere, it can only advise and cannot impose any decision”. Jammu and Kashmir Government constituted a State Autonomy Committee comprising of nine members in 1996 (Order No. 1164-GAD dated 29.11.1996). It had to look into the question of residual sovereignty of the State and relationship with India. The report was published in July 2000. It pointed out that, “…whereas the other Princely States signed the Instrument of Accession to India and subsequently the instrument of merger, the accession of J & K was limited only to 9 191 Primrose Lane, Surrey, London CR0 8YQ (UK) t: +44 2033 711 202 f: +44 2084 329 503 e: [email protected] w: www.jkchr.org WhatsApp: 00 44 771 48 46 431 the areas of Defence, External Affairs and Communication. Uniquely, Jammu and Kashmir State is the only one to have negotiated the terms of its membership of the Union. Right till the Delhi Agreement of 1952, it did not accept any provisions of the Constitution of India other than those agreed in the Instrument of Accession and retained its autonomy”. The findings in the Report of The State Autonomy Committee were a new and an additional challenge to the already existing challenges posed by the political alliance assembled under All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a militant resistance, agreements with the Government of Pakistan and the UN template. Although India and Pakistan in their communications of 1 January 1948 and 15 January 1948 made under article 35 of UN Charter to the UN Security Council have admitted that they had failed to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir dispute through a bilateral engagement under article 33 of the UN Charter, yet at a later date started to turn away from UN SC and settled for a silent regime of quid pro quos. It was difficult for the two countries to turn turtle on the agreements made with the people of the State and obligations accepted at the UN Security Council. No Government in Pakistan could afford to be seen dithering on the Kashmiris Right to self-determination or step back from her claim made in Document II submitted at the UN Security Council on 15 January 1948 that “the accession of the State to the Indian Dominion would be tantamount to signing of their death warrant.” Pakistan has added “that India obtained the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by fraud and violence and that large scale massacre and looting and atrocities on the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State have been perpetrated by the armed forces of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Union and by the non-Muslim subjects of the Maharajah and of the Indian Union.” India had ring fenced itself in her First Bilateral Pledge made on 27 October 1947 of making a reference to the People, in her written assurances given to Prime Minister of Britain Clement Attlee on 26 October 1947 and to Pakistan on 31 October 1947 and to UN on 15 January 1948, on making a reference to the people of Kashmir and on withdrawal of Indian forces. In addition to the terms of Accession and UN template on Kashmir, India faced a well organised political and militant resistance since the beginning of 1990. The strong Kashmiri diaspora became a reliable conduit of popular sentiment. If the Government of Azad Kashmir had genuinely aligned itself with the political resistance started under APHC umbrella in the Indian occupied Kashmir in accordance with her duties under UNCIP Resolutions, under duties flowing from AJK Act 1970 and AJK Constitutional Act 1974 and if the Government of Pakistan had assumed fully in accordance with the Karachi Agreement of 1949 and its assumed duties in Azad Kashmir under UNCIP Resolutions and obligations under UN template, India would have been out from the State by now. Pakistan’s interest under article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan takes effect only after the liberation of the State. The pro accession school of politics has to address the question of relationship with Pakistan, that is, whether it would be like any other province of Pakistan or in the manner of a relationship that the State had confirmed with Pakistan under the Stand Still Agreement in August 1947 or attach itself as an autonomous federating unit. Even before the Indian unlawful action of 5 August 2019, we have been misinterpreting the UN template on Kashmir and a confusion around ‘fettered’ and ‘unfettered’ right of selfdetermination has occupied our best minds. It was unnecessary and gave birth to an avoidable fracture in our ranks. This dissension and misunderstanding has helped neither Kashmir nor Pakistan. On the contrary it has gone into Indian interests and favour. Governments in Pakistan paid more attention to sentiment and little or no attention to the jurisprudence of the case. We failed to build on the help rendered by China and other countries in this regard. China has highlighted the peculiar feature of Kashmir dispute at the 765th meeting of the UN Security Council held on 24 January 1957. China has pointed out that, “This dispute has another peculiar feature. From the very beginning, the Council began with an agreement between two parties. In fact, before the two parties directly concerned ever appeared before the Council, the two parties agreed that the plebiscite should be the answer. What did the Council do? The Council tried to build a solution on this prior agreement that the two parties had before they came to this Council. So the idea of a plebiscite was not imposed by the Council on the two parties.” China added that “In their public statements the statesmen of both countries, India and Pakistan, have stated that they would be willing to let the wishes of the people of Kashmir decide the future of that State. In this Council, in his very first statement in January 1948, the representative of India, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, had this to say: “The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-a-vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, with a right to claim admission as a Member of the United Nations- all this we have recognized to be a matter for unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir, after normal life is restored to them.” [227th meeting, p.29.] We have erred to entertain a we false belief that Kashmir case has been discussed under Chapter VI and therefore the Resolutions were only recommendations and unenforceable. ICJ has addressed this issue in its Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South- West Africa 11 191 Primrose Lane, Surrey, London CR0 8YQ (UK) t: +44 2033 711 202 f: +44 2084 329 503 e: [email protected] w: www.jkchr.org WhatsApp: 00 44 771 48 46 431 (NAMIBIA), in 1950. The Court gave its opinion in the “setting-up of the mandates system “two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of nonannexation and the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form ‘a sacred trust of civilization'” (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 131). The Advisory Opinion rendered by ICJ in regard to Chapter VI1 of the Charter sates, “It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VI1 of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the Charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to “the decisions of the Security Council” adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after Article 24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the functions and powers of the Security Council. If Article 25 had reference solely to decisions of the Security Council concerning enforcement action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, that is to say, if it were only such decisions which had binding effect, then Article 25 would be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter.” The opinion adds that the “Resolution were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25. The decisions are consequently binding on al1 States Members of the United Nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out….Thus when the Security Council adopts a decision under Article 25 in accordance with the Charter, it is for member States to comply with that decision, including those members of the Security Council which voted against it and those Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Council.
keep on strengthening the internal self-determination and keep on working for external selfdetermination. The internal self-determination was flagged as ‘sky is the limit’ by India in February 1994. We have not agitated the various variables and various elements of Kashmir case. There has been no research on the jurisprudence of Kashmir case and the Azad Kashmir Government 12 191 Primrose Lane, Surrey, London CR0 8YQ (UK) t: +44 2033 711 202 f: +44 2084 329 503 e: [email protected] w: www.jkchr.org WhatsApp: 00 44 771 48 46 431 established on 4th October 1947 and re-constituted on 24 October 1947, disengaged itself from its constitutional duty to work around Plebiscite as provided since the introduction of Act 1970. Although it is a shared duty between the Government of Azad Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan, the Act 1974 empowers the Azad Kashmir Government with an exclusive responsibility towards work on “Plebiscite”. The main strength of Kashmir case has been highlighted by China. United Kingdom has introduced Kashmir at the 284th meeting of UN Security Council held on 17 April 1948 as “the greatest and gravest single issue in international affairs”. China has submitted the Articles of Settlement at the UN Security Council for the resolution of Kashmir Dispute and has highlighted a ‘peculiar feature’.